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Administrative law judges are neglected but powerful actors in public welfare bureaucracies,
presiding over quasi-judicial hearings triggered if participants challenge a bureaucratic de-
cision on public welfare benefits. Drawing on ethnographic observations of fair hearings, as
well as interviews with administrative law judges and appellants, this study seeks to understand
the ways in which these judges exercise discretion and how it affects the adjudication of
disputes. Findings suggest that disputes generated by poorly run bureaucracies provide judges
with limited opportunity to use professional skills or discretion to scrutinize bureaucratic
practices. When opportunities for such judgments do arise, judges take widely divergent
paths. Some align themselves with the welfare agency, enforcing bureaucratic practices rather
than scrutinizing them. Others emphasize their neutrality and judicial role, scrutinizing and
aligning agency practices with the law’s underlying purposes.
The ability to adapt rules, and thereby to exercise discretion, is an
entrenched feature of bureaucracies. Variously described as a boon and
a blight, the exercise of discretion can make bureaucracies function
better or worse. Workers can use discretion to individualize rules, fine-
tuning their application so that general laws fit individual circumstances.
Or workers can use discretion to “process rather than engage” clients,
mechanizing the application of rules so that clients can bemoved quickly
through the system (Maynard-Moody and Musheno 2003, 12). How, why,
and when workers in public welfare bureaucracies choose either of these
routes is the subject of much scholarly inquiry (Lipsky 1980, 1984; Brod-
kin 1986, 1997; Handler 1986; Meyers, Glaser, and MacDonald 1998;
Hasenfeld 2000; Sandfort 2000; Lurie 2006; Fording, Soss, and Schram
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2007). The literature focuses primarily on the least powerfully situated
worker in the organizational hierarchy of welfare bureaucracies: the
frontline worker. This study focuses instead on a more powerfully po-
sitioned and neglected bureaucratic actor: the administrative law judge.
Administrative law judges preside over quasi-judicial hearings that are
triggered if participants challenge a denial, discontinuance, or reduction
in public welfare benefits. Hearings are deployed only if a citizen for-
mally challenges the state, and judges have the power to reverse frontline
decisions. The style of decision making differs from that employed by
workers on the front lines. Frontline decision making is hierarchical. It
focuses on processing information accurately, efficiently, and consis-
tently (Mashaw 1983; Adler 2003, 2006). In contrast, administrative law
judges have the autonomy, professional knowledge, and skills to make
individualized and complex determinations (Simon 1983). But as their
title implies, administrative law judges are also bureaucratic actors,
steeped in the language and lore of the bureaucracy. They possess a
vast knowledge of its norms and expectations.
By drawing on ethnographic observations of fair hearings, as well as
on interviews with administrative law judges and appellants, this study
seeks to understand how administrative law judges exercise the discre-
tion granted them by their professional training and their role in the
bureaucracy. It investigates how they navigate the tension caused by their
multiple roles. The study adds to understanding not only of this par-
ticular bureaucratic actor but also of the different ways that skilled,
professional workers use discretion in public welfare bureaucracies.
Context and Background
The predominant view of welfare bureaucracies is that they are an in-
stitutional site whose power is steady, controlling, and often oppressive
toward assertions of individual rights or preferences. As Joel Handler
(1986) explains, welfare bureaucracies are sites of both social control
and social help. Although they provide life-sustaining benefits, they also
“regulate, exclude, and punish deviant behavior” (Handler 1996, 124).
The work they do, Yeheskel Hasenfeld argues (2000, 329), is “moral
work.” It involves sorting people to distinguish the supposedly deserving
from those deemed undeserving. This sorting typically takes the orga-
nizational form of bureaucratic processing. Unlike professional treat-
ment, which is individualized and participatory, bureaucratic processing
is often characterized by a rote and mechanical application of the rules
by low-skilled frontline workers (Simon 1983). Discretion is channeled
by organizational incentives. These incentives encourage workers to
standardize assistance and use service options that fit the needs of the
agency rather than those of the individual (Brodkin 1997). Workers
exercise their discretion negatively, choosing to apply rules narrowly
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and overriding participants’ “substantive status or individual preference”
(Brodkin and Majmundar 2010, 828). Eligible participants may be
wrongfully denied benefits because of the high barriers to claiming them
(Brodkin and Majmundar 2010).
Designed to correct such errors, the fair-hearing system provides a
forum for resolving disputes between frontline workers and citizens. As
noted above, the method of decision making in hearings differs from
that on the front lines. A form of bureaucratic legalism predominates
there; guided by the principles of accuracy, efficiency, and uniformity,
nonprofessional bureaucrats closely apply detailed rules (Mashaw 1983;
Adler 2010; Kagan 2010). In contrast, hearings employ a form of ad-
versarial legalism. Guided by individualized justice, not bureaucratic
uniformity and efficiency, highly trained and skilled professionals weigh
conflicting interpretations of laws and facts (Mashaw 1983; Adler 2010).
The difference between the two settings is perhaps best captured in
their clashing views on the use of discretion. Frontline discretion is
primarily considered something to be tamed and curtailed, but judges
are expected to exercise discretion; it is the hallmark of their profes-
sional role.
Judges, however, are also bureaucratic actors. In over half of the states
they are part of the state welfare bureaucracy that has regulatory and
supervisory oversight of local welfare agencies (Brodoff 2008).1 Unlike
more formal judicial systems, the administrative hearing system imposes
no clear dividing lines to distinguish the roles of the respective govern-
ment officials. Judges and bureaucrats are part of the same welfare
apparatus, although they have different roles. Through their daily in-
teractions with bureaucratic officials, judges may be “‘captured’ by the
agency” (Bernard 2003, 17). Judges also are limited to reviewing the
disputes before them. These are shaped and defined by bureaucratic
practices below. Thus, although hearings are organizationally separate
from the front lines and the everyday workings of the bureaucracy, there
is potential for seepage between the two; judges may use their discretion
to replicate the norms and expectations of bureaucratic decision mak-
ing, failing to check its worst excesses. The current study refers to this
as the “bureaucratic approach.” Or judges may reinforce their desig-
nated role as adjudicators of disputes and may safeguard against arbi-
trary state action. The study calls this the “adjudicator approach.”
This study addresses several questions. What types of disputes are
appealed? How do the nature and quality of these disputes affect the
adjudication process? How do judges with bureaucratic and adjudicator
approaches, respectively, exercise discretion in executing the key tasks
1. In the state where the study was conducted, local agencies (some operated by cities,
others by counties, depending on the locale) administer the program and make the initial
determination of benefits. The state agency has supervisory responsibility and also operates
the fair-hearing system.
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of judging? How do these different approaches affect the adjudication
of disputes?
Methodology
This study draws on data from two different fair-hearing units located
in a state in the northeastern United States. One unit is located in a
suburban area, and the other is in an urban area. The data are the
result of a focused ethnography, a type of sociological ethnography that
examines specific and well-defined interactions, acts, or social situations
in the field rather than an entire system or culture (Knoblauch 2005).
Focused ethnography is characterized by relatively short-term field visits
and intensive data collection. Much of the data come from recordings,
as well as field notes. They allow the researcher verbatim and oral access
to naturally occurring talk in a social interaction. Focused ethnography
is especially suited to the observation of hearing interactions, which are
episodically structured exchanges bounded in space and time.
The two fair-hearing units in this study are part of the same state
welfare bureaucracy. They thus are governed by the same rules and
procedures but differ in size and complexity. The urban fair-hearing
unit hears over 76,000 cases a year and represents a very large and
complex organization involved in the mass processing of cases. The
suburban unit hears less than a thousand and is representative of a
smaller and less complex bureaucracy. The inclusion of both units allows
this study to distinguish the features and characteristics common to the
adjudication process from those related to the demands of each bu-
reaucratic setting.
I conducted observations of 70 hearings presided over by seven judges
in the suburban unit and 129 hearings presided over by 10 judges in
the urban unit. The observations in the suburban unit took place for
a total of 4 months during 2007 and 2008. The observations in the
urban unit took place over a 3-month period in 2009. I conducted all
hearing observations. I did not use a formal selection process in deciding
which suburban unit hearings to observe. On days when there was a
single calendar (i.e., a single judge conducted all hearings), I observed
hearings in the order in which they occurred. On days when there were
two calendars in that unit, I chose hearings on the basis of which ap-
pellant appeared first and was ready to proceed. In the urban unit,
approximately 35 judges hear cases on any given day, and calendars are
assigned by subject matter (e.g., for hearings related to food stamps,
general public assistance, and medical programs). I did not choose the
hearings observed in the urban unit but was assigned by the unit’s
supervising judge to observe a particular judge. Assignments were based
on a combination of factors, including the hearing judge’s availability
and willingness to participate, as well as the nature of the cases he or
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she would preside over on the observation day. I commonly requested
assignment to hearings that involved public assistance cases rather than
hearings on food stamp cases. In between hearings, I also spoke with
the judges.
During the hearings, I maintained a detailed log, recording both what
was said (as much as I was able to record) and other observations. These
other observations include physical descriptions of the parties and the
environment of the room; obvious states of emotions (e.g., anger, crying,
laughter); the parties’ demeanor, tone, and style (e.g., authoritarian,
conciliatory, antagonistic); the level of formality (e.g., how strictly or
loosely procedural rules on evidence and testimony were followed); and
quality of personal interactions (e.g., friendly, hostile, apathetic). I also
recorded routine and standardized data for each hearing observation.
These include the parties present, the issue that prompted the hearing,
and the length of the hearing. I transferred field jottings and obser-
vations into full field notes immediately after actual observations. I used
in-process memos to “identify and develop analytic themes” (Emerson,
Fretz, and Shaw 1995, 100). The state agency responsible for conducting
the hearings also provided an audio recording of each urban-unit hear-
ing I observed. I had these recordings transcribed.
I conducted formal in-depth interviews with five judges in the sub-
urban unit and five judges in the urban unit. I used a semistructured
interview guide consisting of open-ended questions on their initial train-
ing and experience, their approach to conducting hearings, their per-
ception of participants and the hearing process, and their decision-
making processes. The interviews lasted between 1 and 2½ hours. Because
I was not granted permission to tape-record these interviews, I only took
notes. To ensure the accuracy of the notes, I sent each interviewed judge
a copy of the composed notes from our interview and asked him or her
to check the contents for accuracy. Seven of the 10 judges responded
to this request, providing corrections and edits.
Nine appellants from the suburban unit and 21 appellants from the
urban unit were interviewed by a research assistant. If I were able to do
so, I approached appellants after their hearing, giving them a flyer on
the study, inviting them to participate in an interview at a later date,
and requesting their phone number so they could be contacted for a
follow-up interview. The 30 interviewed appellants responded to the
flyer or phone calls and represent at least one appellant from 12 of the
17 judges observed. I used these interviews as a way to triangulate the
data from hearing observations. Because the interview data come from
a different collection method (interviews) and a different data source
(appellants), they provide a more comprehensive understanding of the
data than could be obtained from observation notes alone (Creswell
2007). The semistructured interview consisted of open-ended questions
about the interviewees’ reason for appealing and their experience at
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their hearing. It solicited their perceptions of the judge and the agency
representative. It also asked them to characterize the treatment they
received and perceptions concerning their ability to present their case.
The interviews were recorded and transcribed verbatim.
The unit of analysis for this study is the case, which consists primarily
of the hearing I observed. The focus is on the conversations and inter-
actions that took place in the hearing room, not on the outcome of the
hearing (i.e., who won or lost) or the soundness of the legal positions
held by the parties (the appellant and the agency).2 Rather, the study
focuses on how the appellant’s case was presented, discussed, and
shaped by the parties through the course of the hearing. I use my
informal conversations with the judges in between cases (these were
sometimes but not always about the individual cases I observed) and
the subsequent interviews with the appellants to confirm my observa-
tions. These interactions are also used to further explore the parties’
perceptions and experiences of the hearing process.
Data analysis began with a review of the field notes and transcripts.
In the first reading, I identified major themes and noted them in the
margins of the pages. I then used HyperRESEARCH, a computer soft-
ware program designed for the analysis of qualitative data, to code my
field notes and transcripts. Using grounded theory conventions, I began
analysis by conducting line-by-line open coding; I attached descriptive
codes to lines of data and identified similarities or variations in the text
(Charmaz 2006). Next, I conducted focused coding, which involves iden-
tifying the most noteworthy and frequent line-by-line codes. I also at-
tempted to choose codes that best categorize the salient dimensions of
the emerging themes and patterns (Charmaz 2006). I then conducted
axial coding, which builds codes into categories, defines the properties
and dimensions of each category, and draws contrasts (Charmaz 2006).
In the final step, all codes are integrated through a theoretical coding
process that identifies the central themes in the findings (Charmaz
2006). Coding was an iterative process; I returned to previously coded
transcripts and field notes to confirm, refute, or modify codes as they
developed. I used analytical memos throughout the process. First, I
employed them to define and describe various codes. I then used them
2. A particular outcome may be related to the thoroughness and fairness of the process
and procedures used during hearings. It also may stem from the provisions of law and
from the relative strengths and weaknesses of the parties’ cases. Thus, even a model
hearing, in which appellants have a full and fair opportunity to present their case, can
result in negative outcomes for appellants. Because outcomes are such an imprecise mea-
sure of the quality of the process, they are not included in this study. Also, research firmly
establishes the importance of procedural justice; people care about winning or losing but
care even more about the fairness of the procedures. The components of procedural
justice include voice, neutrality, respectful treatment, and trustworthiness (Casper, Tyler,
and Fisher 1988; Sunshine and Tyler 2003; Tyler 2006). Thus, the study of process is
valuable in its own right.
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to rebuild the coded data and establish a conceptual framework by
exploring categories’ relationships with subcategories (Charmaz 2006).
An example may be useful. In developing the category of judges whose
approach I characterize as bureaucratic, I began with such first-level
and focused codes as “blaming the appellant,” “joining,” “shifting the
focus,” and “narrowing the issues.” I use the code “blaming the appel-
lant” to identify situations in which the agency or judge highlights the
appellant’s mistakes or negligence, poses questions that assume the ap-
pellant is at fault, or asks questions that are not stated neutrally. I assign
the code “joining” to situations in which the agency and judge act as
one front, joining together during the hearing to interrogate the ap-
pellant. I employ the code “shifting the focus” to indicate that the agency
or the judge shifts the focus away from the agency and onto the ap-
pellant. The code “narrowing the issues” describes instances in which
the judge narrowed the issues and emphasized process over substance.
I used these codes and others to develop the axial category “bureaucratic
judging.” I defined the dimensions and properties of the category
through analytic memos. The category describes judges who rely on a
form of excessive proceduralism, both in defining the issues in dispute
and determining what evidence to accept. Theoretical coding occurred
when I used this category and contrasted it with the one for judges who
employed an adjudicatory approach (described below). I employ the
two categories to describe the defining and contrary ways in which judges
use discretion during hearings.
Findings
Nature and Quality of Disputes
Fair hearings are triggered by individuals who receive benefits through
the welfare agency. They usually arise as an appeal of a formal notice
in which the agency advises the recipient that his or her benefits are
being denied, discontinued, or reduced. Appellants can also request a
hearing without such a notice if they think that the agency made an
error; however, the vast majority of appeals are triggered by a formal
notice. The state in this study classifies issues into two main categories:
eligibility issues and those related to work activities. Eligibility issues can
arise if there are questions about whether the appellant established his
or her eligibility for assistance. Issues related to work activities can arise
if there are questions about whether the appellant complied with rules
that condition receipt of assistance on engagement in work activities or
whether the recipient is exempt from those rules.3
3. Federal and state law requires public assistance recipients in the subject county and
city to engage in such work activities as attending assessment appointments, searching for
a job, and working in subsidized or unsubsidized employment or work-experience pro-
This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.82.206 on Thu, 6 Dec 2012 20:42:25 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
276 Social Service Review
Disputes arising from eligibility and work-rules issues can be substan-
tive or procedural. There are substantive eligibility rules concerning
income and resource limits. Procedural rules specify steps for proving
eligibility. These steps include the submission of specified documents
and mandated face-to-face appointments (commonly called recertifi-
cation). Likewise, compliance with the work rules involves a mix of
substantive and procedural activities for both participants and welfare
workers. Workers’ substantive tasks include establishing and evaluating
recipients’ ability to engage in work activities or their reasons for not
attending a specific work-related appointment or activity. One of the
agency’s procedural tasks involves informing participants of the date
and place of mandated work activities. It also is charged with monitoring
participants’ attendance. For the participants, procedural obligations
include notifying the agency if they cannot attend a mandated appoint-
ment and providing documentation of the reasons.
Whether a fair hearing arises from a dispute about process or substance
is in part determined by organizational practices and procedures. Wel-
fare bureaucracies often engage in excess proceduralism, requiring an
abundance of documents and verification procedures. As a conse-
quence, cases that make their way into the fair-hearing system often
reflect this emphasis on procedural compliance. As will be more fully
explained in the next section, some judges reinforce this emphasis,
narrowly defining the scope of disputes to focus on the appellant’s
procedural noncompliance. However, the agency’s compliance with pro-
cedural rules can also be the focus of a dispute. Especially in very large
and complex bureaucracies, the need to process a massive number of
cases can exacerbate the worst excesses of such proceduralism by gen-
erating an avalanche of processing mistakes. This, in turn, can shift the
focus of fair hearings from the appellant’s procedural noncompliance
to the agency’s, consequently altering the ways in which judges exercise
their discretion.
The contrast between the urban and suburban units illustrates this
dynamic. The urban welfare agency handles approximately 186,000 cases
a year; the suburban agency handles about 11,000. Although the size
of a bureaucracy does not necessarily and inevitably determine its pro-
pensity for making mistakes, many of the cases in the urban unit are
riddled with the types of procedural errors that can emanate from the
mass processing of cases. Notices are incomplete or incorrect. They miss
or misstate essential and required information (e.g., the date of a man-
dated appointment). Because of incorrect computer inputs or a failure
to update information, notices are also sent to the wrong addresses.
grams. Failure to comply with the work rules results in the imposition of a sanction, which
is a pro rata reduction of the violator’s portion of the grant. Sanctions can be appealed
through the fair-hearing process. Recipients also may appeal determinations as to whether
disability or other factors make them eligible for exemptions from the work rules.
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Case files lack essential documents, such as proof that the agency sent
the appellant a letter advising him or her of an appointment. At other
times, the case records contradict the notices sent to appellants (e.g.,
the file and notice record different dates for an alleged missed appoint-
ment). In the urban unit, both judges and agency representatives rou-
tinely anticipate and acknowledge the ubiquity of such errors. As one
agency representative drily observed when confronted with yet another
defective notice, “Surprise, surprise, this one is less than perfect.” Cases
in the suburban unit have fewer such defects and are more likely to
proceed to a full hearing on the substance of the dispute.
As a consequence of the norms in the urban unit, judges there have
less opportunity than their suburban counterparts to use their profes-
sional skills and discretion. Cases with procedural irregularities are easily
and quickly resolved; according to the state agency, the agency withdraws
its notice of discontinuance of welfare benefits in nearly 60 percent of
all urban unit cases, obviating the need for a full hearing.4 Judges may
choose to ignore the agency’s procedural breaches and proceed to the
merits of cases, but they rarely do so because the errors are ubiquitous
and obvious. Also, legal principles emphasize due process and the ad-
herence to procedural rules.5 As a practical matter, agency withdrawals
also provide judges with a quick shortcut for resolving disputes because
they eliminate the need for a full hearing and a decision on the merits.
Thus, judges in both the bureaucratic and adjudicator categories rou-
tinely accept and encourage agency offers to withdraw defective notices
of benefit discontinuance. Even after the agency withdraws the discon-
tinuance notice, disputes persist over substantive issues. For example,
the agency may withdraw the discontinuance notice because it did not
correctly identify the date on which the recipient missed a mandated
work appointment. However, an error in the discontinuance notice does
not necessarily mean that the appellant did not miss the scheduled
appointment. The urban unit differs from the suburban counterpart in
that most suburban cases are ready to be adjudicated at the scheduled
hearing; the procedural errors committed by the agency prevent sub-
stantive disputes concerning the work rules from surfacing at hearings.
Reflecting on his role in such cases, one judge observed that hearings
are “band-aids. You are just slapping a band-aid on the problem. You
can’t solve all the problems.”
In sum, bureaucratic practices below shape the nature and quality of
4. In contrast, the withdrawal rate in the suburban unit is only 14 percent.
5. Due process is a principle embedded in the US Constitution; the Fourteenth Amend-
ment prohibits the deprivation of property without due process of law. Its application to
welfare benefits was established by the US Supreme Court in the landmark case Goldberg
v. Kelly (397 U.S. 254 [1970]). The court held that the due process clause requires pre-
termination hearings before welfare benefits are discontinued or reduced. A central com-
ponent of due process is that adequate notice be provided before a negative action is
taken; thus, the defective notices described herein constitute a breach of this requirement.
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the disputes that make their way into the fair-hearing system above. The
disputes generated by a poorly run bureaucracy are different, both qual-
itatively and quantitatively, than disputes generated by one that is run
more effectively. The influence of such practices has consequences for
the role and function of judges. Not all of the urban unit’s cases involve
procedural mistakes by the agency, but many do. When procedural
mistakes occur, judges function as traffic cops, directing the bureaucratic
traffic generated by agency processing errors, rather than making eval-
uative and complex judgments about the underlying disputes.
Exercising Discretion
As noted above, judges occupy a unique perch. Part welfare system bu-
reaucrat and part judicial officer, they can have characteristics of both.
Their professional training and designated role within the bureaucracy
provide a different and fresh perspective from which they can scrutinize
agency practices and procedures, as well as the decisions that result.
But they can also choose not to cast a distinguishing eye, instead ex-
ercising their discretion in ways that are aligned with prevailing practices
on the front line. Earlier research by this author (Lens 2009, forthcom-
ing) develops typologies of judging; some judges, whom I called bu-
reaucrats, predominantly choose to align themselves with the agency
whose decisions they review. They generally act in ways similar to front-
line workers, enforcing the norms and practices of the bureaucracy.
Thus, they fail to fully scrutinize those practices. On the other end of
the spectrum are judges I call adjudicators.6 They continually challenge
and scrutinize the agency, emphasizing their neutrality and role as a
judicial official. This study extends the earlier analysis to closely dissect
how judges in each of these categories execute certain judicial tasks and
to examine how these different approaches affect the processing of
disputes. For purposes of illustration, I choose the cases that provide
the most contrast and are most representative of each approach.
In both counties, judges must be law school graduates admitted to the
state’s bar. They are selected through the state’s civil service system and
must pass the appropriate civil service exam. They are authorized to
preside at hearings by the State Commissioner of Social Services, whom
they represent. They come from a wide range of legal backgrounds.
Some begin in private practice, others in public interest law, still others
in state or local law enforcement. The state makes efforts to recruit
individuals who have worked as legal aid attorneys or have experience
6. As the earlier research reveals, judges can be assigned places on a continuum between
the adjudicator type and the bureaucratic type. All exhibit the characteristics of each type
to some extent. The same judge is capable of acting as an adjudicator in one hearing and
as a bureaucrat in another (especially judges in the middle of the continuum), although
one approach typically predominates.
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with low-income populations. Prior experience as a judge is not a job
requirement; among the 10 judges interviewed, only two had such ex-
perience. Of the 17 judges observed in both units, five are female and
12 male. Two of the 17 judges are people of color. Some have served
as administrative law judges for many years; others had only a few years’
experience.
Judging is a highly skilled and professionalized endeavor. In part, the
variability of approaches among judges is possible because of the wide
discretion inherent in judging. Although the rules of the adversarial
process set the structure for hearings (e.g., requiring coequal participation
by the parties), there is ample room for the judge to determine what is
heard and how. Specifically, two key tasks shape how a hearing proceeds.
First, the judge must decide how the dispute’s issues and parameters
will be defined. Second, the judge must decide what facts are relevant
to the dispute as defined and what evidence is required to prove those
facts. Although judges are expected to be impartial and are not expected
to play an investigatory role, hearings differ from more formal judicial
proceedings in that the regulations permit the judge to assist the ap-
pellant in eliciting documents and testimony, especially if the appellant
has difficulty questioning a witness. The state regulations also provide
that the technical rules of evidence need not apply. Judges thus have
more flexibility in presiding over hearings than they have in other sorts
of proceedings. The ways in which judges execute these tasks reveal how
they perceive themselves in relation to the welfare bureaucracy.
Defining the dispute: process versus substance.—Both frontline and judicial
decision making involve applying a specific law or rule to a specific set
of facts. However, rule-following has different meanings in administra-
tive and judicial contexts. Within the judicial context, rule-following is
a highly skilled endeavor. As one judge put it, “If I don’t follow the
rules, they can just get someone across the street to do it.” It requires
a series of analytical and interpretive steps, including identifying the
relevant law and interpreting it within the context of specific facts. It
also requires recognizing unintended consequences as well as discrep-
ancies between the law as applied and the law’s primary purpose. De-
cisions are fashioned to account for these factors. As Robert Kagan
(2010, 171) notes, a judge “looks backwards to preexisting rules (prec-
edents) to discern what they seem to require, but then ‘looks forward’
to assess the consequences of following an ostensibly applicable rule.”
Judges then use “judicial creativity” to provide a different interpretation
of the rule or to create a new rule (172).
In contrast, rule-following by frontline workers is more routinized and
less analytical. They pay little attention to the general purposes under-
lying the rule. Although some caseworkers may look for ways around
the rules if they deem a client deserving (Maynard-Moody and Musheno
2003), the default position, especially within welfare bureaucracies, is
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the rigid, mechanical application of rules within harsh service technol-
ogies. A web of formal rules and informal practices requires public
assistance recipients to comply with numerous processing demands. For
example, they are required to contact the agency at certain junctures
or to provide particular documents at specific times (Brodkin and Ma-
jmundar 2010). As a consequence, rules are often reduced to process
at the expense of substance; for example, a rule that requires partici-
pants to contact the agency if they cannot attend a scheduled appoint-
ment becomes more important than the overall purpose of the meeting
or the substantive reason for missing it.
Judges can choose to replicate and reinforce this approach by focusing
on participants’ procedural missteps, as the agency defines them, rather
than on the substantive dispute underlying such events. The urban unit
hearing for Rebecca Jones provides an illustrative example of this ap-
proach.7 In the Jones case, the agency discontinued the appellant’s
assistance when she allegedly failed to attend a recertification appoint-
ment and to provide verification of her work hours and residence. The
appellant’s explanation, offered at the beginning of the hearing, was
that she was in school on the date and at the time of the appointment.
She argued that the agency knew she was in school and that she went
back to the agency at a later date to provide the requested documents.
The judge ignored this explanation, focusing instead on her alleged
failure to contact the agency and explain her absence:
Appellant (AP): Uh, I was in school that whole time and they knew because
I . . . I gave them the letter.
Judge (J): That’s all good and well but once they give you an appointment
notice they are expecting something from you by that appointment date. When
they don’t get it they take action against you.
AP: All right.
J: I don’t know why you wouldn’t pick up the phone to try and contact them:
“I’m not going to be able to make it but I’m working on it and I could get it
to you by this date.” Why wouldn’t you do something like that? Why wouldn’t
you follow through?
AP: When I called they messed it up. They always—the phone keeps ringing,
or closes down.
J: You mean just based on past experiences?
AP: Yes.
J: That’s not what happened this time.
AP: It happened this time also. When you call it rings out or just goes—the
line goes dead.
[There is a brief deviation from this line of questioning when the judge asks
the appellant where she went to school and whether it was part-time or full-
time.]
7. To protect the confidentiality of the judges and the appellants, all names of hearing
participants are pseudonyms.
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J: The . . . uh . . . appointment notice . . . um [pause] gives you a phone
number to call, specifically to your worker, that number.
AP: Right, but he’s . . . he’s not my worker. So I didn’t even see him the next
time I came in.
J: But regardless, that’s the number they tell you to contact.
AP: Okay.
J: You know and it’s assigned to an aide—a worker or an aide. That’s the
number they are telling you to contact if you are not able to make the appoint-
ment or unable to get the documents by the due date.
By narrowing the issue to whether the appellant called the agency,
the judge chose to focus solely on rules of process, not on substance.
In essence, she enforced the agency’s rules rather than scrutinizing
them. Thus, she fails to engage in the complex acts that constitute
judging. A more judicial approach would involve considering the
agency’s application of its rules as well as the appellant’s actions. It
would consider the purposes of rules on recertification (to prove on-
going eligibility, as the appellant did) as well as whether the agency’s
practices and procedures interfere with the appellant’s ability to comply.
Instead of dismissing the appellant’s complaints about the agency’s
phone systems, the judge could have examined how the system might
prevent participants from complying with the agency’s directive to call
if they cannot attend a scheduled appointment. The judge also could
explore whether the agency interfered with the goals of welfare law
(e.g., to encourage self-sufficiency) by unilaterally scheduling a recer-
tification appointment when the appellant was in school. By doing so,
the agency forced the appellant to choose between attending the ap-
pointment and attending school.
However, the observations suggest that judges who follow a bureau-
cratic approach are hesitant to delve into such substantive applications
or interpretation of the law. A suburban unit hearing for Danielle Adams
provides another illustrative example. Like the preceding case, the Ad-
ams case involves a discontinuance of assistance for a failure to attend
a recertification appointment and to submit requested documents. The
appellant is cognitively impaired and came to the hearing with a case
manager for the disabled. In response to the judge’s question about
why she failed to attend the appointment, the appellant explained that
she “sometimes forgets.” She said that the notice advising her of the
recertification appointment “didn’t register” but that she subsequently
came in with the requested papers and proved her continuing eligibility.
In response, the judge prompted the agency to submit evidence that it
properly mailed the notice of appointment. The disabled-services case
manager, who is not affiliated with the welfare agency, explained that
the appellant has an IQ of 64. The case manager also testified that she
helped the appellant to reschedule the appointment and submit the
requested documents when the appellant showed her the appointment
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letter a few days after the scheduled date of the recertification appoint-
ment. She also explained that she informed the appellant’s welfare
caseworker of the appellant’s intellectual impairment but that the
agency repeatedly denied the appellant assistance. The judge advised
the appellant to reapply for benefits, to attend all her appointments,
and to submit her documents. After the hearing, and after the appellant
and her case manager left the room, the judge explained that he did
not have the authority to make a judgment on the appellant’s cognitive
ability.
The judge’s use of discretion suggests that he operates with a very
narrow and constricted view of his professional judgment and authority.
He chose to ignore the underlying purposes of the law and to define
the dispute as the agency did: a dispute about process (whether the
agency properly mailed the letter; whether the appellant attended the
appointment) rather than about substance (whether the appellant fully
understands what she is required to do; whether she is eligible to be
recertified). His unwillingness to judge the appellant’s cognitive ability
reveals a reluctance to exercise his professional skills and make an in-
dependent assessment of credibility and fault. Finally, in encouraging
the appellant to resolve the dispute by reapplying, the judge suggests
that the agency’s procedural demands limit his power and fully constrain
his authority.
Judges who follow an adjudicator approach exercise their power and
authority very differently than bureaucratic judges do. Adjudicators in-
tervene more actively in the dispute before them, remedying instead of
replicating the consequences of the agency’s heavy reliance on proce-
dural compliance. This is illustrated by the hearings for Michelle Tyler
and Robert Morris. Handled by different judges in the suburban unit,
these hearings both involve missing documents.
The Morris hearing involved an appeal of a denial of an emergency
grant to restore gas and electricity service shut off for nonpayment. The
agency denied the appellant’s request because he did not submit the
required documents. Specifically, he did not submit verification that he
was unable to enter into an agreement with the utility company to reduce
payments in order to avoid the shutoff. In the Adams hearing, the judge
strictly adhered to the agency’s procedural demands; in contrast, the
judge presiding over theMorris hearing adopted a flexible stance, asking
the agency to work it out. The agency agreed to give the appellant
additional time to submit the document. The judge also retained her
authority over the dispute, suspending the hearing until that afternoon
in order to give the appellant time to secure the document. He did,
and the dispute was resolved.
The judge in the Tyler hearing also intervened to resolve a dispute
regarding missing documents. The agency denied Tyler’s request for
reimbursement of day care expenses because she failed to submit re-
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quired documents. She claimed that she submitted the documents and
“desperately” needed reimbursement. She also indicated that she
needed the agency to provide proof of her ongoing child care benefits
so that she could continue working. The judge halted the hearing and
asked the agency’s representative to contact the appellant’s welfare case-
worker, confirming to the caseworker that the appellant provided the
required records. After the representative did so, the judge arranged,
through the caseworker, for the appellant to receive agency approval
that day for both ongoing and retroactive day care benefits.
In sum, appellants in all four of the described hearings faced a crisis
of need, but the judges in the Tyler and Morris hearings reacted very
differently than the judges in the Jones and Adams hearings. The judges
in the Tyler and Morris proceedings circumvented any procedural ir-
regularity by using their professional discretion and authority to cut
through the red tape and resolve the dispute. Their actions reveal a
view of the law that is more flexible and expansive than the views held
by their counterparts in the Jones and Adams hearings. Part of their
role, the observations suggest, is to ensure that the parties meet the
goals and purposes underlying the law and regulations. Another part is
to ensure that otherwise eligible participants are not denied aid because
of agency practices that impose barriers to claiming welfare benefits
(Brodkin and Majmundar 2010).
Determining the facts and choosing evidence.—Judges can use their dis-
cretion to narrow or expand the set of facts deemed relevant in a dispute.
They also decide which sources of proof they will accept as evidence to
corroborate these facts. On the front lines, relevant facts and sources
of proof are narrowly defined. Agency commands are typically seg-
mented into discrete and specific acts. For example, the agency directs
a recipient to attend a work activity on a given date. If the recipient
misses an appointment, the agency requires an explanation and cor-
responding proof of what happened on that day; the backdrop and
circumstances of participants’ lives are usually deemed irrelevant. Bu-
reaucratic judges often adopt this approach, narrowly limiting the range
of relevant facts and relevant proof.
An illustrative example comes from the hearing held in the suburban
unit for Amanda Ryan. In this case, the appellant challenged a work
sanction. She explained that her child needs continuous care because
he has a traumatic brain injury from being struck by a car. She said that
she told the agency she can only work when he is in school, and she
often leaves work to care for him. She testified that the school was closed
on the day she missed her work appointment. As proof, she submitted
a letter in which her physician confirmed the child’s brain injury and
need for 24-hour care. However, the judge deemed a much narrower
set of facts and proof to be relevant; he wanted confirmation from the
school that it was closed on the day she missed the appointment, and
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the appellant did not have it. The appellant considered the basic facts
of her life to be sufficient proof to explain her absence on that day;
providing care for a severely injured child requires her constant atten-
tion. To the judge, they were not sufficient; his concern fell on the date
in question, not the larger events surrounding it.
A similar case from the urban unit also involved a missed appoint-
ment. The appellant was pregnant and explained that she received treat-
ment for preeclampsia on the date of the appointment. She testified
that she gave birth early, about 2 weeks after her missed appointment,
and that her newborn remained in the hospital for 2 weeks after the
birth. She produced a doctor’s note indicating that she required urgent
care during that time period, but the note was dated after the date of
the missed work appointment. The judge, like the judge in the Ryan
hearing, discounted the appellant’s proof, telling her: “The only ap-
pointment we really want to focus on at this moment is the April 28
appointment with the city.” Also like the judge in the Ryan hearing, he
insisted that the only acceptable proof is verification from a third party;
in this instance, he required proof that she had a medical appointment
on the date in question.
Both judges refused to consider as relevant the facts and circumstances
of the appellants’ lives (the burdens of caring for a severely disabled
child in the first case and the chaos and challenge of a high-risk preg-
nancy in the second). This narrow focus precluded any consideration
of whether the imposition of sanctions in those circumstances was con-
sistent with the overall objectives and goals of the work rules. In essence,
both judges forfeited their judicial prerogative to analyze and interpret
the relevant rules. They failed to examine whether the rules’ underlying
purposes and intent were lost in the minutiae and inflexibility of their
application. In short, they refused to engage in one of the elementary
tasks of judging, which demands more than a rote and rigid application
of the rules.
The observations suggest that adjudicators are also confined by the
rules regarding sanctions. The rules permit the agency to impose a
sanction if a recipient misses a single appointment, no matter what other
work activities they engage in. However, adjudicators are more flexible
than bureaucratic judges in the proof they require. For example, ad-
judicators accepted an appellant’s testimony as proof of an illness but
could require a physician’s verification.8 They also seek ways to mitigate
8. Documentary proof is helpful in all legal proceedings, including administrative hear-
ings, but it is not required. A judge may exercise discretion in deciding which form of
proof (the written or the spoken word) is acceptable in a case. As one judge explained
in an interview, “paper talks,” but judges are in fact encouraged to rely on the testimony
of the appellant. Another judge explained an “unwritten policy” that documentation is
not needed to establish an appellant’s credibility. One may reasonably conclude that the
bureaucratic judges apply a stricter standard of proof than is required.
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the harshness of some of the work rules. During an interview, for ex-
ample, one judge criticized a law requiring participants to comply with
the work rules while they earn a 4-year college degree. He asserted that
the law “penalizes people for being in college.” He explained that his
decisions direct the agency to find a work assignment that is close to
the appellant’s school or to provide sufficient time between school and
the work assignment, so that appellants can get to both. In this way, he
is able to align frontline practices with a primary goal of the work rules:
to encourage self-sufficiency.
Bureaucratic and adjudicator judges also differ in the extent to which
they rely on agency records. Judges who operate under a bureaucratic
approach are more likely to rely on agency records as the primary (and
sometimes only) source of information used to decide a dispute. As
noted above, the hearing system requires that the agency record must
first be free of procedural errors and include properly addressed notices
and supporting documents. Once this threshold is met, bureaucratic
judges are seldom willing to accept arguments that contradict the re-
cords. Such judges treat these records as the agency does, considering
them to be repositories of the most true and accurate version of the
events being contested. Such a perspective makes it difficult for the
appellant to contest or contradict the records. If an event is not recorded
in the file, the agency and some judges assume that it did not occur.
For example, disputes commonly arise over whether appellants sub-
mitted requested documents to the agency; appellants often insist that
the agency lost the documents, and the agency often insists that it never
received the documents. Compared to counterparts who have an ad-
judicator approach, judges with a bureaucratic bent are less receptive
to such testimony. Similarly, if the case file does not include a notation
that the appellant called the agency, bureaucratic judges typically dis-
believe or ignore the appellant’s testimony that he or she called. In
short, bureaucratic judges routinely reject testimony about events if the
testimony cannot be corroborated through bureaucratic verification.
In contrast, adjudicators are more skeptical of the accuracy of agency
records. In an illustrative example from an urban unit hearing, the
agency’s records indicated that the appellant was working and thus
ineligible for assistance. Casting doubt on the veracity of those records,
the judge noted that they are only “internal worksheets” and that “it
could be somebody else with a similar Social Security number or some-
thing.” Likewise, such judges are less likely to assume that agency records
are complete. In an urban unit hearing for Nancy Miller, the appellant
could not produce proof that she went to the agency to make up a work
appointment she missed while recovering from illness. The judge did
not rebuff her; instead, he acknowledged that the agency often fails to
record such contacts, telling her: “They’re gonna drop the ball half the
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time, even if you showed up there and [they] forgot to put down: ‘Oh,
yeah. She was here and I had to turn her away.’”
Differences in judges’ notions on what constitutes acceptable proof
and in their willingness to rely (or not) on agency records mean that
different judges may handle the same issues in very different ways. The
hearings for Richard Mincy and Paula Masters graphically demonstrate
this. Different judges presided over the hearings, but they involved the
same issue: whether the appellant was medically able to comply with
work rules. In the Mincy hearing from the suburban unit, the judge
chose to narrow the acceptable proof to a standard employability form
completed by a physician and submitted by the agency. The form in-
dicated that the appellant was employable but had some limitations. It
provided minimal information on the appellant’s medical condition and
used check marks to indicate the appellant’s ability to perform a variety
of activities (e.g., standing, walking). The appellant attempted to submit
additional evidence, both through testimony and more detailed medical
reports, that he suffers from several ailments and that the combination
of conditions makes it difficult for him to work. The judge rebuffed his
proof, telling him, “It’s not relevant. What’s relevant is whether or not
you could work.” He continued: “The issue is employability, not what
disease you have.” The judge further explained: “I’m not a doctor. I
can’t make a diagnosis.”
In contrast, the file in the Masters hearing from the urban unit also
included evidence that the appellant was employable with limitations,
but the judge treated this evidence as the beginning of the inquiry, not
the end. Unlike the judge in the Mincy hearing, the judge in the Masters
hearing positioned the appellant as a source of authority for her own
medical condition, asking her, “Why do you feel you can’t work?” She
noted she had one problem, and to insure that he had a complete
picture of her many ailments, the judge asked whether she also “ha[d]
any other problems?” He methodically elicited both her oral testimony
and the evidence from medical records she brought. He occasionally
read from the records, which detailed her many aliments, the treatments
she received, and the list of her medications.
In the Masters hearing, the judge gave the appellant the space and
time she needed to present her version of the facts. In doing so, he
fulfilled one of the primary tasks of judging: to elicit testimony and
evidence from each side of the dispute so that he can reconcile con-
flicting facts and make a decision. In the Mincy hearing, the judge did
exactly the opposite. She refused to consider any evidence from the
appellant. She relied solely on an agency-approved employability form,
suggesting that facts are disposable unless they are accepted in the
bureaucratic realm. Her refusal to consider the appellant’s evidence
seemed to indicate that her decision was preordained and the hearing
itself a formality.
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Discussion
Bureaucratic administration and judicial decision making are often at
odds with one another. As Jerry Mashaw observes, adjudication “is pro-
foundly anti-bureaucratic” (1992, 1055–56); adjudication emphasizes in-
dividualized justice, but bureaucratic administration is concerned with
uniformity. The adversarial system is premised on conflict and the le-
gitimacy of opposing views, but administration is premised on the con-
sistent application of one view. Bureaucracies run on hierarchy and
centralization; adjudications are decentralized and nonhierarchical.9
Adjudication emphasizes the use of discretion; administration deem-
phasizes it. Bureaucracies that use both bureaucratic and adjudicative
types of decision making (most do) are constructed, in essence, to con-
tinually reenact the classic conflicts: rules versus discretion, the individ-
ual versus the masses, and hierarchy versus decentralization.
These tensions can be beneficial. A decision-making system attuned
to the individual can fine-tune laws meant for mass application and
prevent unjust or unintended consequences. A surfeit of professional
knowledge, discretion, and skill can act as an antidote to an excess of
rules and an unskilled workforce. A system that requires participation
by appellants, as does the adversarial process, can compensate for their
lack of input in decision making on the front lines.
However, any seepage between the two systems must be guarded
against if these benefits are to occur. As a threshold requirement, the
disputes generated on the front lines must be ripe for resolution by the
fair-hearing system. This study’s findings suggest that too many agency
errors, especially errors of process, can prevent the ultimate resolution
of disputes. Instead of providing an opportunity for judges to exercise
their professional expertise, the existence of so many procedural errors
reduces their role to that of a clerk who processes paperwork and sends
it back to the agency. Much like what occurs on the front lines, inter-
actions in the hearings are condensed into exchanges over paperwork
and process rather than substance and need. In essence, hearings be-
come indistinct from the bureaucracy, providing only temporary relief
while failing to uncover and scrutinize the substantive conflicts under-
lying disputes.
Maintaining the distinction between the administrative and the ju-
dicial, a task that falls within a judge’s authority and control, is essential
in resolving disputes that are ripe for review. As this study’s findings
9. Unlike judges in judicial courts, administrative law judges are supervised. Their de-
cisions are issued in the name of the State Commissioner of Social Services and their
supervisor. (A small number of judges issue decisions in their own names.) However, their
determinations typically prevail because of the large volume of cases, the professional
status of the judge, and the fact that a presiding judge assesses appellants’ credibility
through personal contact with the parties.
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suggest, judges can take widely divergent paths in exercising their dis-
cretion, and these paths have different consequences. Judges with a
bureaucratic approach break down the often-fragile wall separating the
front lines from the hearing room, and that wall is required if hearings
are to function properly. Instead of employing a different form of de-
cision making, they parallel the bureaucracy by focusing on process and
the rote application of rules.
Consistent with bureaucratic demands for standardization, judges who
operate under a bureaucratic approach apply detailed procedural de-
mands uniformly to all, obscuring or ignoring the capabilities and cir-
cumstances of individual clients. The Adams hearing provides a partic-
ularly striking example of this. Despite evidence of the appellant’s
impairment and eligibility for assistance, the judge chose to focus on
the narrow question of whether an intellectually impaired appellant
submitted requested documents on time, claiming he did not have the
authority to assess whether her impairments compromised her ability
to do so.
Similarly, judges who follow a bureaucratic approach adhere closely
to the rigid and narrow standards that frontline workers employ to assess
proof. In this hierarchy of proof, agency records nearly always trump
appellants’ offers of evidence. Also limited is the range of documents
accepted as proof; such judges ask for nothing more or less than the
same document required on the front lines. This restrictive view of
evidence diminishes other defining features of judicial decision making:
the ability to attend to the nuances of language and context, as well as
the ability to draw from alternative sources in assessing the coherence
and credibility of appellants’ explanations.
In contrast, judges who adopt the adjudicator approach use their
power and authority to individualize disputes and encourage competing
versions. They replace the front line’s often-mechanical checklist of
documents with a wider range of documents and other types of proof.
Their skepticism and scrutiny of agency records creates a space where
alternative explanations can emerge. They are more willing than bu-
reaucratic judges to consider the goals and purposes underlying the law
and rules, as the judges in the Tyler and Morris hearings did when they
cut through the red tape to consider one appellant’s eligibility for an
emergency utility grant and another’s for day-care reimbursement.
This study’s evidence can be viewed from a different perspective. One
might contend that the bureaucratic judges also consider the goals and
purposes underlying welfare reform. Under the 1996 law (110 Stat.
2105), welfare ceases to be an entitlement. These judges give meaning
and effect to that provision as well as to the law’s emphasis on personal
responsibility and self-sufficiency. Adherence to the formalistic demands
embedded in regulations and agency practices is characteristic of the
legal model of decision making, but it can also be viewed as a way to
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uphold the rule of law (Simon 1983). Arguably, the judge in the Jones
case was doing just this when she identified the appellant’s alleged
failure to call the agency as the linchpin of the case. This perspective
suggests that the difference between the approaches of adjudicator and
bureaucratic judges is not whether the purposes of the law are consid-
ered but which purposes take priority.
However, this study’s examples, and particularly the Jones case, sug-
gest that bureaucratic judges do not simply choose between conflicting
goals; they eschew consideration of such goals if weighing them requires
scrutinizing the agency’s practices. In essence, such judges apply a dou-
ble standard. For example, the judge in the Jones case scrutinized the
appellant’s behavior for evidence of personal responsibility (whether
she contacted the agency) but did not examine agency practices that
may discourage the exercise of responsibility (e.g., a poorly designed
communication system that may render a recipient’s exercise of personal
responsibility futile). Of course, an assessment of both appellant actions
and agency practices does not mandate a particular outcome; a judge
could conclude that the appellant was at fault, or not. But it ensures
that the law is applied in an evenhanded way to both the agency and
appellants.10 It also ensures the preservation of the law’s underlying
goals.
Common among the bureaucratic judges is the failure to exercise
such evenhandedness by scrutinizing the agency’s practices, as well as
the appellants’ actions. In this, they eviscerate the purpose and promise
of hearings. The failure renders hearings ineffectual as a check against
arbitrary agency action, including actions that may undermine the pur-
poses of the law. Instead of making an independent assessment of what
the rules require, bureaucratic judges substitute the agency’s view of
the rules. This view is often grounded in a form of excess proceduralism.
Such actions hinder rather than advance the legal mode of decision
making, which requires more than a rote and rigid application of the
rules. Potential misapplications of the law remain uncorrected, and goal
displacement, the particular plague of welfare bureaucracies (Brodkin
1986), remains unchecked.
Emphasis on due process and the way in which each individual case
fits within the purposes of the law can, at times, clash with the efficient
and uniform implementation of public policy. The emphasis slows im-
plementation, stressing different values and concerns (Asimow 1999).
However, this study suggests that the adjudicators compensate for and
correct some of the deficiencies of administration on the front lines.
10. Judges differ over which goals to emphasize, especially in the context of a law that
encourages help along with hassle (Mead 2003). But such differences are inevitably a part
of any adjudicatory system, and judges often disagree over the interpretation of laws. Such
disputes are often resolved through the appeals process, available here in the form of
court review of fair-hearing decisions.
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They do so by aligning themselves with the practices and procedures
of the adversarial system. Far from impeding public policy, they advance
it by replacing the often mechanized judgments of the front lines with
an individualized approach that more closely aligns with the purposes
of the law. Their close scrutiny enhances the possibility that hearing
decisions will affect frontline practices.11
The adjudicator’s individualized and assertive approach also some-
times lends itself to problem solving. In the Tyler and Morris hearings,
the judges used their authority to pressure the agency to resolve the
disputes. Arguably, such an approach reveals less a legal than a social
work orientation; the judge intervenes in the dispute as a benevolent
supervisor on the front lines might. Notably, however, judges in both
cases worked within the confines of the law and the procedural demands
of the bureaucracy. They did not alter the eligibility rules or the agency’s
demand for a specific document; in one case, the judge requested only
that the appellant be given time to obtain the required document. In
another, the judge asked the agency representative to confirm receipt
of documents. He then suggested that the agency resolve the matter in
the appellant’s favor. In short, they asked but did not direct. They fa-
cilitated a solution to the dispute in ways not unfamiliar to judges in
other legal settings. The solution allowed them to rectify the goal dis-
placement and slippage that often occurs on the front lines. Adjudicator
judges, including those who seek to resolve disputes rather than adju-
dicate them, maintain a distinction between a legal model of decision
making and what William Simon (1983) refers to as the social work
model. It involves a more flexible and individualized form of decision
making than that found in the legal model, which is more directly
guided by rules and regulations.
The existence of both adjudicator and bureaucratic approaches in
the same system raises an obvious question: why the differences? Vari-
ations in style are of course inevitable, especially in positions that involve
high levels of skill and discretion (Conley and O’Barr 1990), but the
type of variation here is of particular interest; some judges are captured
by the bureaucracy and others are not. Choosing an arguably surprising
path that reduces their power and authority, bureaucratic judges deem-
phasize their skills and professional training. The form of rule following
that they exhibit is usually less common among managers and elites
than among workers with little power. A combination of hierarchy and
status insecurity leads workers to rely heavily and mechanically on rules
rather than exercising an individualized style of decision making (Mer-
11. Empirical evidence is lacking on whether hearing decisions can reform frontline
practices, although research assumes that they do not (see Super 2005). One could imagine
that such reforms might happen if the agency continually loses hearings because it sched-
ules appellants’ appointments at inconvenient times or fails to improve its communication
systems.
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ton 1940; Herzfeld 1993; Oberfield 2010). Moreover, unlike frontline
workers, judges face little risk from exercising discretion in complex
ways. Judges may use discretion without making interpretive judgments
about appellants’ moral worth (Maynard-Moody and Musheno 2003).
The proper use of discretion involves following their professional train-
ing as well as the principles and practices that guide adversarial pro-
ceedings.
Many factors shape an individual’s behavior within an organization
(Saks and Ashforth 1997). Judges in this study received similar training
and supervision. They operate in the same organizational environment
under the same laws and regulatory structure. It is thus noteworthy that
they follow different approaches. This suggests that several factors, not
just organizational environment, influence the ways in which the judges
choose to exercise their discretion. This study does not find that gender
or ethnicity links to discernible patterns in the style of judging. Larger
sample sizes and a different methodological approach are needed to
determine the effects of such characteristics. Further research is also
needed to identify other factors.
The bureaucratic approach to judging also serves as a cautionary tale.
One view is that a more professionalized work force is the answer to
what ails bureaucracies, and particularly welfare bureaucracies. Profes-
sional judgment and discretion, the argument goes, will produce rea-
sonable and rational decisions that are closely aligned with the purposes
of the law (Adler 2010; Kagan 2010). This study suggests, however, that
the mere existence of professionals is insufficient to achieve such out-
comes; even highly skilled professionals who hold positions of relative
power within the bureaucratic hierarchy will choose not to exercise that
power.
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